TY - JOUR
T1 - When does a partner's reputation impact cooperation effects in partnerships?
AU - Zhang, Zhe
AU - Jia, Ming
AU - Wan, Difang
PY - 2012/9
Y1 - 2012/9
N2 - We examine how formal contracts moderate the relationship between a partner's reputation and cooperation effects in public-private (P-P) partnerships. We base our analysis on differences between formal contracts, which require a series of legal agreements, and informal contracts, which may be implicit and/or unwritten. We argue that a partner's reputation is more likely to impact cooperation effects in the context of strong formal or informal contracts. Using a sample of 244 partners from various P-P partnerships in the medical and healthcare fields in China, we find that the positive relationship between a partner's reputation and cooperation effects is stronger given the existence of strong formal and/or informal contracts. We conclude that in China, where there is a weak legal system that rarely offers or enforces sufficient protections to contract signatories, it is safer to cooperate with a partner who has a good reputation. Such a reputation correspondingly enhances cooperation effects. Moreover, this relationship may be amplified when there are strong formal and/or informal contracts, all of which may be associated with cooperation between the public and private sectors.
AB - We examine how formal contracts moderate the relationship between a partner's reputation and cooperation effects in public-private (P-P) partnerships. We base our analysis on differences between formal contracts, which require a series of legal agreements, and informal contracts, which may be implicit and/or unwritten. We argue that a partner's reputation is more likely to impact cooperation effects in the context of strong formal or informal contracts. Using a sample of 244 partners from various P-P partnerships in the medical and healthcare fields in China, we find that the positive relationship between a partner's reputation and cooperation effects is stronger given the existence of strong formal and/or informal contracts. We conclude that in China, where there is a weak legal system that rarely offers or enforces sufficient protections to contract signatories, it is safer to cooperate with a partner who has a good reputation. Such a reputation correspondingly enhances cooperation effects. Moreover, this relationship may be amplified when there are strong formal and/or informal contracts, all of which may be associated with cooperation between the public and private sectors.
KW - China
KW - Cooperation effects
KW - Formal contract
KW - Informal contract
KW - P-P partnerships
KW - Partner reputation
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84865425181
U2 - 10.1007/s10490-010-9197-5
DO - 10.1007/s10490-010-9197-5
M3 - 文章
AN - SCOPUS:84865425181
SN - 0217-4561
VL - 29
SP - 547
EP - 571
JO - Asia Pacific Journal of Management
JF - Asia Pacific Journal of Management
IS - 3
ER -