Distributed Aperiodic Control of Multibus DC Microgrids with DoS-Attack Resilience

In this article, we present a distributed aperiodic control algorithm for multibus DC microgrids to realize proper current sharing and voltage regulation under denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. To deal with the DoS attacks, an estimation mechanism using only local information is designed when the communication channels are jammed, which avoids persistent load fluctuations or instability of bus voltages caused by malicious attacks. Moreover, an aperiodic communication mechanism is employed using the local and neighbors' current states stored in the zero-order holder to determine the communication instants. The proposed resilient aperiodic control achieves proportional load current sharing and maintains the weighted average bus voltage invariant simultaneously. Voltage drift under DoS attacks can be avoided. Furthermore, sufficient stability conditions are established for control gains concerning the attack parameters. The Lyapunov synthesis shows that the current sharing error can exponentially converge towards an adjustable set, and the weighted average bus voltage can be maintained at its nominal value. The advantages of the proposed control are illustrated by switch-level simulations and a hardware-in-the-loop experiments.