TY - GEN
T1 - DeFort
T2 - 33rd ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis, ISSTA 2024
AU - Xie, Maoyi
AU - Hu, Ming
AU - Kong, Ziqiao
AU - Zhang, Cen
AU - Feng, Yebo
AU - Wang, Haijun
AU - Xue, Yue
AU - Zhang, Hao
AU - Liu, Ye
AU - Liu, Yang
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2024 Owner/Author.
PY - 2024/9/11
Y1 - 2024/9/11
N2 - Although Decentralized Finance (DeFi) applications facilitate tamper-proof transactions among multiple anonymous users, since attackers can access the smart contract bytecode directly, vulnerabilities in the transaction mechanism, contract code, or third-party components can be easily exploited to manipulate token prices, leading to financial losses. Since price manipulation often relies on specific states and complex trading sequences, existing detection tools have limitations in addressing this problem. In addition, to swiftly identify the root cause of an attack and implement targeted defense and remediation measures, auditors typically prioritize understanding the methodology behind the attack, emphasizing 'how' it occurred rather than simply confirming its existence. To address these problems, this paper presents a novel automatic price manipulation detection and analysis framework, named DeFort, which contains a price manipulation behavior model to guide on-chain detection, multiple price monitoring strategies to detect pools with abnormal token prices, and various profit calculation mechanisms to confirm attacks. Based on behavioral models, DeFort can automatically locate transactions and functions that cause abnormal price fluctuations and identify attackers and victims. Experimental results demonstrate that DeFort can outperform state-of-the-art price manipulation detection methods. Furthermore, after monitoring 441 real-world projects for two months, DeFort successfully detected five price manipulation attacks.
AB - Although Decentralized Finance (DeFi) applications facilitate tamper-proof transactions among multiple anonymous users, since attackers can access the smart contract bytecode directly, vulnerabilities in the transaction mechanism, contract code, or third-party components can be easily exploited to manipulate token prices, leading to financial losses. Since price manipulation often relies on specific states and complex trading sequences, existing detection tools have limitations in addressing this problem. In addition, to swiftly identify the root cause of an attack and implement targeted defense and remediation measures, auditors typically prioritize understanding the methodology behind the attack, emphasizing 'how' it occurred rather than simply confirming its existence. To address these problems, this paper presents a novel automatic price manipulation detection and analysis framework, named DeFort, which contains a price manipulation behavior model to guide on-chain detection, multiple price monitoring strategies to detect pools with abnormal token prices, and various profit calculation mechanisms to confirm attacks. Based on behavioral models, DeFort can automatically locate transactions and functions that cause abnormal price fluctuations and identify attackers and victims. Experimental results demonstrate that DeFort can outperform state-of-the-art price manipulation detection methods. Furthermore, after monitoring 441 real-world projects for two months, DeFort successfully detected five price manipulation attacks.
KW - blockchain
KW - decentralized finance (DeFi)
KW - price manipulation attack
KW - smart contract
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85205581707
U2 - 10.1145/3650212.3652137
DO - 10.1145/3650212.3652137
M3 - 会议稿件
AN - SCOPUS:85205581707
T3 - ISSTA 2024 - Proceedings of the 33rd ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis
SP - 402
EP - 414
BT - ISSTA 2024 - Proceedings of the 33rd ACM SIGSOFT International Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis
A2 - Christakis, Maria
A2 - Pradel, Michael
PB - Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
Y2 - 16 September 2024 through 20 September 2024
ER -