Defending against Energy Dispatching Data integrity attacks in smart grid

The smart grid is a new type of energy-based cyber-physical system (CPS), which enables interactions between the utility provider and customers through smart meters and advanced metering infrastructures (AMI). Nonetheless, an adversary can inject misleading energy usage information to the utility provider through compromised smart meters and disrupt the grid and electricity market operations. To address this issue, in this paper, we propose an Energy Dispatching False Data Defense (EDF2D) approach, which can effectively detect the forged interactive information between customers and the utility provider with a great accuracy and mitigate the damage raised by attacks on grid operations. Particularly, EDF2D uses the historical interactive information of normal users to determine the conditional probabilities of data anomalies. Based on these conditional probabilities, a Bayesian network designed for detecting false data can be established by EDF2D, and this network is then used to confirm the authenticity of interactive information received by the utility provider originally transmitted from customers. Through a combination of theoretical analysis and performance evaluation, our experimental data shows that EDF2D can effectively detect harmful false interactive data forged by the adversary and mitigate false data injection attacks on smart grid operations.