TY - JOUR
T1 - A Game-Theoretic Approach for Electric Vehicle Aggregators Participating in Phase Balancing Considering Network Topology
AU - Huang, Jing
AU - Wang, Xiuli
AU - Wang, Yifei
AU - Shao, Chengcheng
AU - Chen, Guo
AU - Wang, Peng
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2010-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2024/1/1
Y1 - 2024/1/1
N2 - With the increasing popularity of electric vehicles (EVs), uncontrolled charging of single-phase plug-in EVs will result in severe three-phase unbalance problem in distribution networks. To solve the problem, a phase balancing (PB) scheme performed by EV aggregators (EVAs) based on the linear multiphase power flow model is proposed in this paper. In the scheme, the PB compensations are provided to encourage EVAs to help the distribution system operator reduce the phase unbalance of the entire grid. Considering all EVAs are selfish and rational, the PB scheme is formulated as a game problem, in which each EVA competes with other EVAs to determine its charging strategy to minimize the charging cost minus the PB compensation. The consideration of coupling voltage constraints leads this game model to a challenging generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). By employing the theory of variational inequality, the properties of solutions for the GNEP are investigated. Furthermore, a two-level distributed algorithm is designed to find the unique variational solution, a fair and stable solution. Finally, comprehensive case studies are conducted on the IEEE-13 and IEEE-123 test systems to corroborate that the proposed PB game model can effectively mitigate voltage unbalance and cut EV users' costs.
AB - With the increasing popularity of electric vehicles (EVs), uncontrolled charging of single-phase plug-in EVs will result in severe three-phase unbalance problem in distribution networks. To solve the problem, a phase balancing (PB) scheme performed by EV aggregators (EVAs) based on the linear multiphase power flow model is proposed in this paper. In the scheme, the PB compensations are provided to encourage EVAs to help the distribution system operator reduce the phase unbalance of the entire grid. Considering all EVAs are selfish and rational, the PB scheme is formulated as a game problem, in which each EVA competes with other EVAs to determine its charging strategy to minimize the charging cost minus the PB compensation. The consideration of coupling voltage constraints leads this game model to a challenging generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). By employing the theory of variational inequality, the properties of solutions for the GNEP are investigated. Furthermore, a two-level distributed algorithm is designed to find the unique variational solution, a fair and stable solution. Finally, comprehensive case studies are conducted on the IEEE-13 and IEEE-123 test systems to corroborate that the proposed PB game model can effectively mitigate voltage unbalance and cut EV users' costs.
KW - Phase balancing
KW - electric vehicle aggregators
KW - generalized Nash equilibrium problem
KW - network topology
KW - two-level distributed algorithm
KW - variational inequality
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85160273668
U2 - 10.1109/TSG.2023.3276242
DO - 10.1109/TSG.2023.3276242
M3 - 文章
AN - SCOPUS:85160273668
SN - 1949-3053
VL - 15
SP - 743
EP - 756
JO - IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
JF - IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
IS - 1
M1 - 3276242
ER -