负 荷 侧 灵 活 性 资 源 的 价 格 响 应 调 节 意 愿 参 数 化 估 计

Price-based demand response (PBDR) can enable flexibility demand-side resources (DSFRs) to provide regulation capability for power systems, and its regulation effects are directly related to the regulation willingness of each resource entity. However, this regulation willingness has the characteristic of being difficult to directly obtain. To address this, a parameterized estimation method of the regulation willingness based on the inversion of historical energy consumption data is proposed from a non-cooperative game equilibrium perspective. First, a parameterized decision model for the price response of individual DSFR is developed, and based on this, a non-cooperative game problem is constructed for large-scale DSFRs to participate in PBDR. Second, by adopting the variational inequalities and strong duality of linear programming, a non-cooperative game equilibrium problem for demand response is then reformulated as an equivalent equilibrium condition consisting of a set of linear inequalities. Based on this, integrating the construction form of prior information for the regulation willingness function, the inverse variational inequalities driven by historical energy consumption data are constructed to achieve the parameterized estimation of regulation willingness for DSFRs in PBDR, and its computational efficiency is analyzed. Additionally, a generalization error evaluation metric for regulation willingness estimation is defined, and its upper bound of generalization error is derived using uncertain convex programming theory. The generalization ability of the proposed parameterized estimation method for regulation willingness is analyzed theoretically. Finally, through case analyses, the accuracy of the proposed parameterized estimation method for regulation willingness is validated, and the role of the accuracy of prior information in the regulation willingness estimation is explored.