竞争环境下非对称平台的兼并策略及社会福利研究

This paper is based on the bilateral market theory and considers the asymmetric market scale between platforms. We divide the merger model into two types: Strong expansion and weak self-rescue. The decision-making changes of platforms are analyzed when adopting different operation strategies (independent or combined operation). This paper also examines the merger strategies of asymmetric platforms under the competitive conditions and the changes in total social welfare and anti-monopoly supervision. The results indicate that, first, if the platform chooses the strong expansion merger mode, it tends to pursue the strategy of merger operation to obtain greater profits, assuming there is no “merger paradox” phenomenon. Second, the merger strategy of the self-help of the weak platform is related to the difference in market size between platforms. Third, the platform’s merger behavior under different strategies is likely to enhance overall social welfare. Finally, the market supervision department should focus on different aspects of anti-monopoly supervision under different cross-network externalities and post-merger operation strategies.