基于平均场博弈的钢铁生产企业电 碳市场非合作博弈均衡分析

With the promotion of the electricity market reform and the national carbon market construction, the high energy-consumption and high carbon-mission enterprises are required to participate in the market operation. The strategic behavior of the large amount of such enterprises in the electricity and carbon markets will have a huge impact on their own operation, the electricity prices, and the carbon prices. This paper takes the iron and steel enterprise as example to analyze their impacts on the markets. Firstly, a model of carbon emission and power consumption based on the production process of an iron and steel enterprise is established. Secondly, based on the models of the electricity prices and carbon emission markets, the strategic operation and trading decision model of the iron and steel enterprise is built, together with the market equilibrium model. Towards the computation complexity when there is a large amount of the market participants, the equilibrium solution based on the mean-field game theory is proposed. The existence, uniqueness and the equivalence to the original problem of the mean-field equilibrium is proved. Additionally, the Mann-type iterative format is adopted to design an accelerated algorithm to further accelerate the solution process. Finally, the feasibility and the computational efficiency of the proposed method are validated by numerical tests.