Stackelberg game based energy and reserve management for a fast electric vehicle charging station

Tianyang Zhao; Xuewei Pan; Shuhan Yao; Peng Wang

doi:10.1109/ECCE.2017.8095956

Stackelberg game based energy and reserve management for a fast electric vehicle charging station

Tianyang Zhao
, Xuewei Pan
, Shuhan Yao
, Peng Wang

Nanyang Technological University
Harbin Institute of Technology Shenzhen

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

The problem of energy and reserve exchange between electric vehicles (EVs) and fast charging station (FCS) is studied using a Stackelberg game. In this game, the FCS operator, who acts as a leader, needs to set its energy and reserve prices to optimize its revenue while ensuring EV users' charging demand. On the other hand, EV users, who act as the followers, needs to decide their charging and reserve strategies to optimize a tradeoff between the benefit from battery charging and reserves provision. It is shown that the proposed game possesses a social optimal Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the FCS operator optimizes its prices and the EV users choose their equilibrium strategies. A mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) reformulation of the game is proposed and can be solved efficiently by commercial software packages. The reformulation enables the FCS operator and EV users to reach the equilibrium and is assessed by extensive simulations.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	2017 IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition, ECCE 2017
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	1417-1424
Number of pages	8
ISBN (Electronic)	9781509029983
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ECCE.2017.8095956
State	Published - 3 Nov 2017
Externally published	Yes
Event	9th Annual IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition, ECCE 2017 - Cincinnati, United States Duration: 1 Oct 2017 → 5 Oct 2017

Publication series

Name	2017 IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition, ECCE 2017
Volume	2017-January

Conference

Conference	9th Annual IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition, ECCE 2017
Country/Territory	United States
City	Cincinnati
Period	1/10/17 → 5/10/17

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 7 Affordable and Clean Energy

Keywords

Fast charging station
Regulation reserve
Stackelberg game

Access to Document

10.1109/ECCE.2017.8095956

Cite this

Zhao, T., Pan, X., Yao, S., & Wang, P. (2017). Stackelberg game based energy and reserve management for a fast electric vehicle charging station. In 2017 IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition, ECCE 2017 (pp. 1417-1424). Article 8095956 (2017 IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition, ECCE 2017; Vol. 2017-January). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/ECCE.2017.8095956

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title = "Stackelberg game based energy and reserve management for a fast electric vehicle charging station",

abstract = "The problem of energy and reserve exchange between electric vehicles (EVs) and fast charging station (FCS) is studied using a Stackelberg game. In this game, the FCS operator, who acts as a leader, needs to set its energy and reserve prices to optimize its revenue while ensuring EV users' charging demand. On the other hand, EV users, who act as the followers, needs to decide their charging and reserve strategies to optimize a tradeoff between the benefit from battery charging and reserves provision. It is shown that the proposed game possesses a social optimal Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the FCS operator optimizes its prices and the EV users choose their equilibrium strategies. A mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) reformulation of the game is proposed and can be solved efficiently by commercial software packages. The reformulation enables the FCS operator and EV users to reach the equilibrium and is assessed by extensive simulations.",

keywords = "Fast charging station, Regulation reserve, Stackelberg game",

author = "Tianyang Zhao and Xuewei Pan and Shuhan Yao and Peng Wang",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2017 IEEE.; 9th Annual IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition, ECCE 2017 ; Conference date: 01-10-2017 Through 05-10-2017",

year = "2017",

month = nov,

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doi = "10.1109/ECCE.2017.8095956",

language = "英语",

series = "2017 IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition, ECCE 2017",

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Zhao, T, Pan, X, Yao, S & Wang, P 2017, Stackelberg game based energy and reserve management for a fast electric vehicle charging station. in 2017 IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition, ECCE 2017., 8095956, 2017 IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition, ECCE 2017, vol. 2017-January, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 1417-1424, 9th Annual IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition, ECCE 2017, Cincinnati, United States, 1/10/17. https://doi.org/10.1109/ECCE.2017.8095956

Stackelberg game based energy and reserve management for a fast electric vehicle charging station. / Zhao, Tianyang; Pan, Xuewei; Yao, Shuhan et al.
2017 IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition, ECCE 2017. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2017. p. 1417-1424 8095956 (2017 IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition, ECCE 2017; Vol. 2017-January).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

TY - GEN

T1 - Stackelberg game based energy and reserve management for a fast electric vehicle charging station

AU - Zhao, Tianyang

AU - Pan, Xuewei

AU - Yao, Shuhan

AU - Wang, Peng

PY - 2017/11/3

Y1 - 2017/11/3

N2 - The problem of energy and reserve exchange between electric vehicles (EVs) and fast charging station (FCS) is studied using a Stackelberg game. In this game, the FCS operator, who acts as a leader, needs to set its energy and reserve prices to optimize its revenue while ensuring EV users' charging demand. On the other hand, EV users, who act as the followers, needs to decide their charging and reserve strategies to optimize a tradeoff between the benefit from battery charging and reserves provision. It is shown that the proposed game possesses a social optimal Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the FCS operator optimizes its prices and the EV users choose their equilibrium strategies. A mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) reformulation of the game is proposed and can be solved efficiently by commercial software packages. The reformulation enables the FCS operator and EV users to reach the equilibrium and is assessed by extensive simulations.

AB - The problem of energy and reserve exchange between electric vehicles (EVs) and fast charging station (FCS) is studied using a Stackelberg game. In this game, the FCS operator, who acts as a leader, needs to set its energy and reserve prices to optimize its revenue while ensuring EV users' charging demand. On the other hand, EV users, who act as the followers, needs to decide their charging and reserve strategies to optimize a tradeoff between the benefit from battery charging and reserves provision. It is shown that the proposed game possesses a social optimal Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the FCS operator optimizes its prices and the EV users choose their equilibrium strategies. A mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) reformulation of the game is proposed and can be solved efficiently by commercial software packages. The reformulation enables the FCS operator and EV users to reach the equilibrium and is assessed by extensive simulations.

KW - Fast charging station

KW - Regulation reserve

KW - Stackelberg game

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85041486918

U2 - 10.1109/ECCE.2017.8095956

DO - 10.1109/ECCE.2017.8095956

M3 - 会议稿件

AN - SCOPUS:85041486918

T3 - 2017 IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition, ECCE 2017

SP - 1417

EP - 1424

BT - 2017 IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition, ECCE 2017

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

T2 - 9th Annual IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition, ECCE 2017

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ER -

Zhao T, Pan X, Yao S, Wang P. Stackelberg game based energy and reserve management for a fast electric vehicle charging station. In 2017 IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition, ECCE 2017. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2017. p. 1417-1424. 8095956. (2017 IEEE Energy Conversion Congress and Exposition, ECCE 2017). doi: 10.1109/ECCE.2017.8095956

Stackelberg game based energy and reserve management for a fast electric vehicle charging station

Abstract

Publication series

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UN SDGs

Keywords

Access to Document

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