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Robust Nash equilibrium seeking for multi-agent systems via event-triggered communication and control over directed graphs

  • Southeast University, Nanjing

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This article investigates Nash equilibrium seeking in noncooperative games for multi-agent systems under event-triggered communication and control, with the aim of improving resource efficiency. To reduce communication load and actuator wear caused by continuous communication and actuation, two distributed event-triggered Nash equilibrium seeking strategies are developed. An event-triggered algorithm is first proposed for uncertainty-free multi-agent systems over directed communication graphs, and then extended to systems subject to unknown disturbances and unmodeled nonlinear dynamics by incorporating an extended state observer (ESO) and the robust integral of the sign of the error (RISE) technique. Rigorous Lyapunov-based analysis establishes exponential stability of the Nash equilibrium for ideal systems and asymptotic stability under uncertainties. The designed triggering conditions exclude Zeno behavior. Finally, simulation experiments motivated by practical scenarios validate the proposed algorithms.

Original languageEnglish
Article number509
JournalNonlinear Dynamics
Volume114
Issue number7
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 2026
Externally publishedYes

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

  1. SDG 8 - Decent Work and Economic Growth
    SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth
  2. SDG 12 - Responsible Consumption and Production
    SDG 12 Responsible Consumption and Production

Keywords

  • Event-triggered mechanism
  • Extended state observer
  • Nash equilibrium seeking
  • Robust control

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