Resilient observer-based event-triggered control for cyber-physical systems under asynchronous denial-of-service attacks

We develop the resilient observer-based event-triggered control update strategy in this paper. It is utilized to achieve the input-to-state stability (ISS) of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) when there is an asynchronous denial-of-service (DoS) attack, which is launched by malicious adversaries both on measurement channel and control channel in a random attack strategy. To estimate the unmeasurable states while saving the limited networked bandwidth, an H_∞ observer-based event-triggered control scheme is first designed to guarantee the ISS of CPSs with economic communication. Moreover, the occurrence of Zeno behavior can be eliminated by providing the existence of a lower positive bound of any two inter-event times. Then, a recursive model of asynchronous DoS attacks is introduced. A resilient control update strategy is proposed and further analyzed to derive the stability criterion of CPSs. At last, a numerical simulation example is given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the introduced control update policy.