Product service supply chain network competition: an equilibrium with multiple tiers and members

To overcome product homogenisation issues, an increasing number of supply chain members have been binding their competitive advantages to services which extend supply chain competition to a new dimension. This paper proposes a product service supply chain (PSSC) network competition model with multiple competing manufacturers and retailers offering demand-enhancing and costly services. In order to obtain the decision-making results in a non-cooperative game context, equilibrium conditions are established using variational inequality, and the qualitative properties are discussed. We compare the two competition scenarios, price competition only and simultaneous price and service competition, to discover the impact of service-offering on supply chain members. After introducing the service competition, both manufacturers and retailers realise higher profits and marginal profits with the same service costs. In contrast, the manufacturers' marginal profits achieve higher growth rates. We also find that (a) the increase of the demand sensitivities to the service levels of retailers would contribute more to the revenue growth of the whole PSSC network and (b) when service costs are different for manufacturers and retailers, the optimal decision-making on service levels are not only affected by the service costs of the members in the same tier but also correlated with those in other tiers.