On data integrity attacks against optimal power flow in power grid systems

Qingyu Yang; Yuanke Liu; Wei Yu; Dou An; Xinyu Yang; Jie Lin

doi:10.1109/CCNC.2017.7983272

On data integrity attacks against optimal power flow in power grid systems

Qingyu Yang
, Yuanke Liu
, Wei Yu
, Dou An
, Xinyu Yang
, Jie Lin

Faculty of Electronic and Information Engineering

Xi'an Jiaotong University
Towson University

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

12 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the data integrity attack against Optimal Power Flow (OPF) with the least effort from the adversary's perspective. The investigated attack can first select the minimum number of target nodes to compromise by analyzing the difference between the capacity of transmission line and the real transmission power, and then search for a critical attack vector (with a goal to minimize the amount of information to manipulate) as an optimal attack strategy. To defend against such an attack, we develop the defensive scheme by protecting the critical nodes. Based on various IEEE standard systems, we show the effectiveness of our investigated attack scheme and the corresponding defense schemes.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	1008-1009
Number of pages	2
ISBN (Electronic)	9781509061969
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CCNC.2017.7983272
State	Published - 17 Jul 2017
Event	14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017 - Las Vegas, United States Duration: 8 Jan 2017 → 11 Jan 2017

Publication series

Name	2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017

Conference

Conference	14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017
Country/Territory	United States
City	Las Vegas
Period	8/01/17 → 11/01/17

Keywords

Critical attack vector
Data integrity attacks
Defense strategy
Optimal power flow

Access to Document

10.1109/CCNC.2017.7983272

Cite this

Yang, Q., Liu, Y., Yu, W., An, D., Yang, X., & Lin, J. (2017). On data integrity attacks against optimal power flow in power grid systems. In 2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017 (pp. 1008-1009). Article 7983272 (2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CCNC.2017.7983272

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title = "On data integrity attacks against optimal power flow in power grid systems",

abstract = "In this paper, we investigate the data integrity attack against Optimal Power Flow (OPF) with the least effort from the adversary's perspective. The investigated attack can first select the minimum number of target nodes to compromise by analyzing the difference between the capacity of transmission line and the real transmission power, and then search for a critical attack vector (with a goal to minimize the amount of information to manipulate) as an optimal attack strategy. To defend against such an attack, we develop the defensive scheme by protecting the critical nodes. Based on various IEEE standard systems, we show the effectiveness of our investigated attack scheme and the corresponding defense schemes.",

keywords = "Critical attack vector, Data integrity attacks, Defense strategy, Optimal power flow",

author = "Qingyu Yang and Yuanke Liu and Wei Yu and Dou An and Xinyu Yang and Jie Lin",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2017 IEEE.; 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017 ; Conference date: 08-01-2017 Through 11-01-2017",

year = "2017",

month = jul,

day = "17",

doi = "10.1109/CCNC.2017.7983272",

language = "英语",

series = "2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017",

publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",

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booktitle = "2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017",

}

Yang, Q, Liu, Y, Yu, W, An, D , Yang, X & Lin, J 2017, On data integrity attacks against optimal power flow in power grid systems. in 2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017., 7983272, 2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 1008-1009, 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017, Las Vegas, United States, 8/01/17. https://doi.org/10.1109/CCNC.2017.7983272

On data integrity attacks against optimal power flow in power grid systems. / Yang, Qingyu; Liu, Yuanke; Yu, Wei et al.
2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2017. p. 1008-1009 7983272 (2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution › peer-review

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T1 - On data integrity attacks against optimal power flow in power grid systems

AU - Yang, Qingyu

AU - Liu, Yuanke

AU - Yu, Wei

AU - An, Dou

AU - Yang, Xinyu

AU - Lin, Jie

PY - 2017/7/17

Y1 - 2017/7/17

N2 - In this paper, we investigate the data integrity attack against Optimal Power Flow (OPF) with the least effort from the adversary's perspective. The investigated attack can first select the minimum number of target nodes to compromise by analyzing the difference between the capacity of transmission line and the real transmission power, and then search for a critical attack vector (with a goal to minimize the amount of information to manipulate) as an optimal attack strategy. To defend against such an attack, we develop the defensive scheme by protecting the critical nodes. Based on various IEEE standard systems, we show the effectiveness of our investigated attack scheme and the corresponding defense schemes.

AB - In this paper, we investigate the data integrity attack against Optimal Power Flow (OPF) with the least effort from the adversary's perspective. The investigated attack can first select the minimum number of target nodes to compromise by analyzing the difference between the capacity of transmission line and the real transmission power, and then search for a critical attack vector (with a goal to minimize the amount of information to manipulate) as an optimal attack strategy. To defend against such an attack, we develop the defensive scheme by protecting the critical nodes. Based on various IEEE standard systems, we show the effectiveness of our investigated attack scheme and the corresponding defense schemes.

KW - Critical attack vector

KW - Data integrity attacks

KW - Defense strategy

KW - Optimal power flow

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DO - 10.1109/CCNC.2017.7983272

M3 - 会议稿件

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T3 - 2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017

SP - 1008

EP - 1009

BT - 2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

T2 - 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017

Y2 - 8 January 2017 through 11 January 2017

ER -

Yang Q, Liu Y, Yu W, An D , Yang X , Lin J. On data integrity attacks against optimal power flow in power grid systems. In 2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2017. p. 1008-1009. 7983272. (2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017). doi: 10.1109/CCNC.2017.7983272

On data integrity attacks against optimal power flow in power grid systems

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