TY - JOUR
T1 - Omni-channel retailing
T2 - Do offline retailers benefit from online reviews?
AU - Li, Yiming
AU - Li, Gang
AU - Tayi, Giri Kumar
AU - Cheng, T. C.E.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2019/12
Y1 - 2019/12
N2 - In the omni-channel retailing era, online reviews are being increasingly integrated into offline channels. In this study we explore the online review integration strategy for a pure offline retailer that takes the initiative to integrate selective online consumer reviews (OCR)from its competing online rival retailer into its in-store sales under two online selling formats. When the online retailer uses the reselling format, we find that the online review integration strategy is viable if the selected OCR are more informative than the offline retailer's in-store information services. However, when the online retailer uses the agency selling format, counter-intuitively, the offline retailer can adopt the same strategy even when the OCR are less informative than the in-store services if the spillover effect is negative, and the travel cost and the unit misfit cost are relatively small. In each case, we find that the offline retailer's review integration strategy mitigates market competition under some conditions, so benefitting the online retailer and/or the manufacturer as well. In the extension, we consider the context in which the offline retailer utilizes third-party reviews (TPR). We find that the offline retailer is willing to adopt TPR as long as its product is recommended by the TPR (under the TPR-only strategy), and it is also beneficial to integrate OCR and TPR simultaneously (under the OCR-TPR strategy). In addition, we compare all the feasible strategies and find that the OCR-TPR strategy is the optimal strategy most of the time.
AB - In the omni-channel retailing era, online reviews are being increasingly integrated into offline channels. In this study we explore the online review integration strategy for a pure offline retailer that takes the initiative to integrate selective online consumer reviews (OCR)from its competing online rival retailer into its in-store sales under two online selling formats. When the online retailer uses the reselling format, we find that the online review integration strategy is viable if the selected OCR are more informative than the offline retailer's in-store information services. However, when the online retailer uses the agency selling format, counter-intuitively, the offline retailer can adopt the same strategy even when the OCR are less informative than the in-store services if the spillover effect is negative, and the travel cost and the unit misfit cost are relatively small. In each case, we find that the offline retailer's review integration strategy mitigates market competition under some conditions, so benefitting the online retailer and/or the manufacturer as well. In the extension, we consider the context in which the offline retailer utilizes third-party reviews (TPR). We find that the offline retailer is willing to adopt TPR as long as its product is recommended by the TPR (under the TPR-only strategy), and it is also beneficial to integrate OCR and TPR simultaneously (under the OCR-TPR strategy). In addition, we compare all the feasible strategies and find that the OCR-TPR strategy is the optimal strategy most of the time.
KW - Game theory
KW - Information integration
KW - Omni-channel retailing
KW - Online reviews
KW - Online selling format
KW - Spillover effect
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85065830928
U2 - 10.1016/j.ijpe.2019.05.002
DO - 10.1016/j.ijpe.2019.05.002
M3 - 文章
AN - SCOPUS:85065830928
SN - 0925-5273
VL - 218
SP - 43
EP - 61
JO - International Journal of Production Economics
JF - International Journal of Production Economics
ER -