False data injection attacks against smart gird state estimation: Construction, detection and defense

As a typical representative of the so-called cyber-physical system, smart grid reveals its high efficiency, robustness and reliability compared with conventional power grid. However, due to the deep integration of electrical components and computinginformation in cyber space, smart gird is vulnerable to malicious attacks, especially for a type of attacks named false data injection attacks (FDIAs). FDIAs are capable of tampering meter measurements and affecting the results of state estimation stealthily, which severely threat the security of smart gird. Due to the significantinfluence of FDIAs on smart grid, the research related to FDIAs has received considerable attention over the past decade. This paper aims to summarize recent advances in FDIAs against smart grid state estimation, especially from the aspects of background materials, construction methods, detection and defense strategies. Moreover, future research directions are discussed and outlined by analyzing existing results. It is expected that through the review of FDIAs, the vulnerabilities of smart grid to malicious attacks can be further revealed and more attention can be devoted to the detection and defense of cyber-physical attacks against smart grid.