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Edge-Event-Based Distributed Resilient Control of DC Microgrid Against Multipattern Deception Attacks

  • Xiaojie Qiu
  • , Bo Fan
  • , Yingchun Wang
  • , Wenchao Meng
  • , Qinmin Yang
  • Zhejiang University
  • Northeastern University China

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Cyber attacks and limited communication resources are two important problems in cyber–physical dc microgrid (MG). This article proposes an edge-event-triggered-based distributed resilient model-free adaptive control (MFAC) method for the dc MG suffering multipattern deception attacks to achieve secure voltage restoration and proportional current sharing. It is the first time to construct the distributed MFAC framework that can ensure the consensus of input signals, rather than the output bus voltage, to meet the fundamental requirement for distributed secondary controller design in the dc MG. Second, to deal with the multipattern deception attacks characterized by stochastic and successive variables, a novel data-driven predictive algorithm with an adaptive decay rate is developed to compensate for the polluted input signals, thus mitigating the negative impact of the attacks on the system. Moreover, an edge-event-triggered mechanism (EETM) with a switch-adjustable threshold parameter is designed to reduce communication frequency between any pair of adjacent DGs. Through rigorous mathematical analysis, the convergence of the bus voltage tracking errors is proved, and some comparison experiments are offered to verify the theoretical results.

Original languageEnglish
JournalIEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - 2025

Keywords

  • DC microgrid (MG)
  • deception attacks
  • distributed model-free adaptive control (MFAC)
  • edge-event-triggered mechanism (EETM)
  • predictive compensation algorithm

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