Dynamic power strategy space for non-cooperative power game with pricing

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Nash non-cooperative power game can be effectively used to find the power equilibrium point to enhance edge user throughput in downlink multi-user multiple-input multipleoutput (MU-MIMO) wireless networks. However, the power strategy space of the existing Nash non-cooperative power games are generally statically pre-determined without adapting to the changing wireless environment. To address this problem, we explore a novel framework of Nash non-cooperative power game with dynamic and environment-adaptive power strategy space. Then, we propose a non-cooperative water-filling power game with pricing (WFPGP), wherein the power strategy space is dynamically determined by iterative water-filling algorithm. We derive the sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of the WFPGP game which can be implemented in a distributed manner. Simulation results are used to compare the performance of WFPGP with the other Nash non-cooperative power games and confirm the stable and superior performance advantages of WFPGP.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2017 IEEE 86th Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC Fall 2017 - Proceedings
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages1-6
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781509059355
DOIs
StatePublished - 2 Jul 2017
Externally publishedYes
Event86th IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC Fall 2017 - Toronto, Canada
Duration: 24 Sep 201727 Sep 2017

Publication series

NameIEEE Vehicular Technology Conference
Volume2017-September
ISSN (Print)1550-2252

Conference

Conference86th IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, VTC Fall 2017
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityToronto
Period24/09/1727/09/17

Keywords

  • Iterative waterfilling
  • Multi-user multiple-input multiple-output
  • Nash non-cooperative game
  • Pricing game

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