Distributed energy trading for an integrated energy system and electric vehicle charging stations: A Nash bargaining game approach

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

121 Scopus citations

Abstract

The increasing concerns of energy utilization and climate change have promoted the permeation of various smart energy subsystems on the distribution level, such as integrated energy systems (IESs) and electric vehicle charging stations (EVCSs). These subsystems typically act separately during operation and their transaction values have not yet been well investigated. In this paper, we propose an energy trading model based on the Nash bargaining game to study cooperative benefits between an IES and several EVCSs. The proposed model not only considers individual interests, but also enables the players to fairly benefit from cooperation. In particular, the uncertainties of the market prices, renewable energies and integrated demand response are considered. To ensure that the entire game is computationally tractable, the original problem is decomposed into a major energy trading problem and an additional payment bargaining problem. Furthermore, a distributed algorithm based on modified Benders decomposition is used to overcoming the players’ privacies. The results show the considerable benefits where the costs of the IES may be reduced by 3.89% and the profits associated with the EVCSs may be increased by at least 7.8%. The proposed algorithm is proven to be able to find the optimal global solutions efficiently and accurately.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)513-530
Number of pages18
JournalRenewable Energy
Volume155
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 2020

Keywords

  • Distributed algorithm
  • Electric vehicle charging stations
  • Integrated energy systems
  • Nash bargaining theory

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Distributed energy trading for an integrated energy system and electric vehicle charging stations: A Nash bargaining game approach'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this