Competitive Aggregation of Electric Vehicles for Emergency Supply: Model, Equilibrium, and Efficiency Loss

The proliferation of electric vehicles (EVs) has introduced a promising resource for relieving power deficits during emergencies. However, the dispatch-based management for numerous EVs faces challenges stemming from the lack of incentives for EVs and the ignorance of the self-serving behavior of load-serving entities (LSEs) in satisfying their own demand. To bridge this gap, this paper proposes a two-part payment mechanism as an incentive approach for vehicle-to-grid (V2G) contributions and conducts an analysis of competition among LSEs for EV aggregation. Leveraging cost function reformulation, the competitive aggregation is formulated as a non-cooperative game. The concept of generalized smoothness condition is introduced to quantify the efficiency loss incurred by the competition. This condition is then interpreted into an optimization problem, which, through parameterization and equivalent reformulation, transforms into a tractable linear programming problem capable of analytically competitive efficiency loss computation. The scalability and computation efficiency of the proposed method are validated in case studies, shedding lights on its applicability for policy designers to control the efficiency loss in EV aggregation for emergency supply.