Behavior analysis of wind power producer in electricity market

Renewable energy generation plays an important role in exploiting renewable energy towards green economy. The electricity market should be not only reevaluated with the coming of renewable energy, but also modified for maintaining market fairness and better utilization of renewable energy. Based on a Stackelberg game model, this paper puts forward a closed-form analysis on wind power producer's (WPP's) behavior in the electricity market involving large scale wind power. The WPP acts as a price-maker in DA market and a deviator in RT balancing market. The analytical expression of WPP's behavior indicates how a WPP takes an action under various market regulations and statuses, including bidding regulations, deviation settlements, demand elasticity, market capacity, and renewable subsidy. Furthermore, the two-part compound bidding mode is verified and recommended for restraining WPP's market power when considering ramping constraints of conventional units. The presented models are validated using real-world data based on the IEEE 118-bus test system. Conclusions provide beneficial references for policy formulation of electricity market involving large scale wind power.