A TEMPEST Attack Implementation based on Hidden Markov model in Smart Grid

  • Hong Qiao
  • , Kaiyi Wang
  • , Tanlong Huang
  • , Xianyong Xu
  • , Shuai Liu
  • , Junxingxu Chen

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

Abstract

A Smart Grid contains a large number of terminals to gather voltage, current, and power data. If these terminals are attacked by hackers to steal data and disrupt the operation of the grid, the grid will encounter a huge challenge. And side channel attack is an attack way that uses information signals (such as electromagnetic radiation, and computer hardware running sound) inadvertently released by the computer to decipher. The computer keyboard generates electromagnetic radiation signals during operation, and hackers may acquire your account and password through the keyboard's tapping sound, resulting in the leakage of important data. This article analyzes the electromagnetic radiation leakage vulnerabilities of keyboards and designs a way to implement a TEMPEST (Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Emanation Surveillance Technology) Attack based on the Hidden Markov model, which can provide a foundation for avoiding potential risk.

Original languageEnglish
Article number012009
JournalJournal of Physics: Conference Series
Volume2774
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2024
Externally publishedYes
Event2024 1st International Conference on Smart Grids and Power Systems, ICSGPS 2024 - Zhangjiajie, China
Duration: 12 Jan 202414 Jan 2024

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