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A game theoretic model for equilibrium pricing of futures electricity contracts

  • IEEE
  • Tsinghua University
  • Xi'an Jiaotong University

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Due to the unique characteristics of electricity markets, the traditional methods to futures contracts pricing, which have been widely used to common commodity, can not be applied directly. This paper presents a Cournot game model for equilibrium pricing of futures electricity contracts. In the game, each Genco optimizes a generation asset allocation problem between monthly futures contracts and the daily spot market, with consideration of market power in futures market, price risk in spot market and operating costs and constraints of generating units. An iterative method is applied to obtain the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the futures contract prices. Finally, the possible factors influencing the futures price equilibriums are discussed with case studies.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationIEEE Power and Energy Society 2008 General Meeting
Subtitle of host publicationConversion and Delivery of Electrical Energy in the 21st Century, PES
DOIs
StatePublished - 2008
EventIEEE Power and Energy Society 2008 General Meeting: Conversion and Delivery of Electrical Energy in the 21st Century, PES - Pittsburgh, PA, United States
Duration: 20 Jul 200824 Jul 2008

Publication series

NameIEEE Power and Energy Society 2008 General Meeting: Conversion and Delivery of Electrical Energy in the 21st Century, PES

Conference

ConferenceIEEE Power and Energy Society 2008 General Meeting: Conversion and Delivery of Electrical Energy in the 21st Century, PES
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPittsburgh, PA
Period20/07/0824/07/08

Keywords

  • Cournot game
  • Electricity markets
  • Futures contract
  • Generation asset allocation

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